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Dynamic demand and mean-field games
Dario Bauso
Abstract—Within the realm of smart buildings and smart cities,
dynamic response management is playing an ever-increasing
role thus attracting the attention of scientists from different
disciplines. Dynamic demand response management involves a
set of operations aiming at decentralizing the control of loads
in large and complex power networks. Each single appliance
is fully responsive and readjusts its energy demand to the
overall network load. A main issue is related to mains frequency
oscillations resulting from an unbalance between supply and
demand. In a nutshell, this paper contributes to the topic by
equipping each signal consumer with strategic insight. In partic-
ular, we highlight three main contributions and a few other minor
contributions. First, we design a mean-field game for a population
of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs), study the mean-field
equilibrium for the deterministic mean-field game and investigate
on asymptotic stability for the microscopic dynamics. Second, we
extend the analysis and design to uncertain models which involve
both stochastic or deterministic disturbances. This leads to robust
mean-field equilibrium strategies guaranteeing stochastic and
worst-case stability, respectively. Minor contributions involve the
use of stochastic control strategies rather than deterministic, and
some numerical studies illustrating the efficacy of the proposed
strategies.
Index Terms—mean-field games, stochastic stability, power
networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response involves a set of operations aiming at
decentralizing load control in power networks [1], [12], [13],
[28]. In particular, it calls for the alteration of the timing or
of the total electricity by end-use customers from their normal
consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of
electricity. This is possible also through the design of incentive
payments to induce lower electricity use at off-peak times.
A communication protocol aggregates information on past,
current and forecasted demand and transmits it to each load
controller, which will increase or decrease the proper load. The
novelty of this paper is that fully responsive load control is
obtained by enhancing the intelligence on the demand side of
the grid. This leads to a less-prescriptive environment in which
the loads, rather than being pre-programmed to adopt specific
switching behaviors, are designed as intelligent appliances
selecting their switching behaviors as best-responses to the
population behavior. The population behavior is sensed by the
individual appliances through the mains frequency state. In this
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paper, fully responsive load control is reviewed in the context
of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs), in smart buildings
or plug-in electric vehicles [2], [21], [22], [26].
A first idea is to use stochastic strategies rather than
deterministic as in [2], [4]. Each TCL selects a probability
with which to switch on and off. Thus a probability value of
1
2 means that the TCL is 50% on and 50% off. It has been
shown in [2], [4] that stochastic response strategies outperform
deterministic ones, especially in terms of attenuating the mains
frequency oscillations. These are due to the unbalance between
energy demand and supply (see e.g. [23]). The mains fre-
quency usually needs to be stabilized around a nominal value
(50 Hz in Europe). If electricity demand exceeds generation
then frequency will decline, and vice versa.
The model used in this paper is as follows. Each single
TCL is a player and is characterized by two state variables,
the temperature and the functioning mode. The state dynamics
of a TCL — henceforth referred to as microscopic dynamics
— describes the time evolution of its temperature and mode
in the form of a linear ordinary differential equation in the
deterministic case, and of a stochastic differential equation
in the stochastic case. Such dynamics is different from the
dynamics of the aggregate temperature and functioning mode
of the whole population, which is henceforth referred to as
macroscopic dynamics. In addition to the state dynamics, each
TCL is programmed with a given finite-horizon cost functional
that accounts for i) energy consumption, ii) deviation of
mains frequency from the nominal one, and iii) deviation
of the TCL’s temperature from a reference value. Bringing
together in the objective functional both individual costs (in
the form of energy consumption and deviation from a reference
temperature) and common costs (in the form of the individual
contribution to the deviation of the mains frequency from the
nominal one) is original to the best of the author’s knowledge.
More formally, the mains frequency involved in specifics ii)
mentioned above is used in a cross-coupling mean-field term
that incentivizes the TCL to switch to off if the mains
frequency is below the nominal value and to switch to on
if the mains frequency is above the nominal value. In other
words, the cross-coupling mean-field term models all kinds of
incentive payments, benefits, or smart pricing policies aiming
at shifting demand from high-peak to off-peak periods.
A. Highlights of contributions
This paper provides three main results. First, in the spirit of
prescriptive game theory and mechanism design [3] we design
a mean-field game for the TCLs application, study the mean-
field equilibrium for the deterministic mean-field game and in-
vestigate on asymptotic stability for the microscopic dynamics.
Asymptotic stability means that both the temperature and the
mode functioning of each TCL converge to the reference value.
A second result relates to the stochastic case, characterized by
a stochastic disturbance in the form of a Brownian motion
in the microscopic dynamics. After establishing a mean-field
equilibrium, we provide some results on stochastic stability.
In particular, we focus on two distinct scenarios. In one
case, we assume that the stochastic disturbance expires in
a neighborhood of the origin. This reflects in having the
Brownian motion coefficients linear in the state. The resulting
dynamics is well-known in the literature as geometric Brow-
nian motion. As for any geometric Brownian motion, we can
study conditions for it to be stochastically stable. This means
that the state trajectories are moment bounded. In a second
case, the stochastic disturbance is independent on the state and
the Brownian motion coefficients are constant. This leads to a
dynamics which resembles the Langevin equation. Following
well-known results on the Langevin equation, the dynamics is
proven to be stochastically stable in the second-moment. An
expository work on stochastic analysis and stability is [20].
A third result deals with robustness for the microscopic
dynamics. The dynamics is now influenced by an additional
adversarial disturbance, with bounded resource or energy.
Even for this case, we study the mean-field equilibrium and
investigate on conditions that guarantee worst-case stability.
The stochastic stability analysis and the worst-case analysis
under adversarial disturbances add originality to the mean-
field game approach.
B. Literature overview
We introduce next two streams of literature. One is related
to dynamic response management, while the second one is
about the theory of differential games with a large number of
indistinguishable players, also known as mean-field games.
1) Related literature on demand response: Examples of
papers developing the idea of dynamic demand management
are [10], [11], [21], [22]. In particular, [10] provides an
overview on the redistribution of the load away from peak
hours and the design of decentralized strategies to produce
a predefined load trajectory. This idea is further developed
in [11]. To understand the role of game theory in respect to
this specific context the reader is referred to [21]. There, the
authors present a large population game where the agents are
plug-in electric vehicles and the Nash-equilibrium strategies
(see [6]) correspond to distributed charging policies that redis-
tribute the load away from peaks. The resulting strategies are
known with the name of valley-filling strategies. In this paper
we adopt the same perspective in that we show that network
frequency stabilization can be achieved by giving incentives
to the agents to adjust their strategies in order to converge to a
mean-field equilibrium. To do this, in the spirit of prescriptive
game theory [3], a central planner or game designer has to
design the individual objective function so to penalize those
agents that are in on state in peak hours, as well as those
who are in off state in off-peak hours. Valley-filling and
coordination strategies have been shown particularly efficient
in thermostatically controlled loads such as refrigerators, air
conditioners and electric water heaters [22].
2) Related literature on mean-field games: A second stream
of literature related to the problem at hand is on mean-field
games. Mean-field games were formulated by Lasry and Lions
in [19] and independently by M.Y. Huang, P. E. Caines and
R. Malhame´ in [17], [18]. The mean-field theory of dynamical
games is a modeling framework at the interface of differential
game theory, mathematical physics, and H∞-optimal control
that tries to capture the mutual influence between a crowd
and its individuals. From a mathematical point of view the
mean-field approach leads to a system of two PDEs. The
first PDE is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. The
second PDE is the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation
which describes the density of the players. Explicit solutions in
terms of mean-field equilibria are available for linear-quadratic
mean-field games [5], and have been recently extended to more
general cases in [14].
The idea of extending the state space, which originates in
optimal control [24], [25], has been also used to approximate
mean-field equilibria in [8].
More recently, robustness and risk-sensitivity have been
brought into the picture of mean-field games [9], [27] where
the first PDE is now the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equa-
tion. For a survey on mean-field games and applications
we refer the reader to [15]. A first attempt to apply mean-
field games to demand response is in [4]. Mean-field based
control in power systems is studied also in [29] and [30] with
focus on energy storage devices and electric water heating
loads respectively. Regarding the computational investigation
for mean-field game theory, a similar algorithm to the one
presented in this paper is presented in [31].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we state
the problem and introduce the model. In Section III we review
some preliminary results. In Section IV we state and discuss
the main results. In Section V we carry out some numerical
studies. In Section VI we provide some discussion. Finally, in
Section VII we provide some conclusions.
C. Notation
The symbol E indicates the expectation operator. We use ∂x
and ∂2xx to denote the first and second partial derivatives with
respect to x, respectively. Given a vector x ∈ Rn and a matrix
a ∈ Rn×n we denote by ‖x‖2a the weighted two-norm xTax.
The symbol ai• means the ith row of a given matrix a. We
denote by Diag(x) the diagonal matrix in Rn×n whose entries
in the main diagonal are the components of x. We denote by
dist(X,X∗) the distance between two points X and X∗ in
Rn. We denote by ΠM(X) the projection of X onto set M.
The symbol “:” denotes the Frobenius product. We denote by
]ξ, ζ[ the open interval for any pair of real numbers ξ ≤ ζ.
II. POPULATION OF TCLS THROUGH MEAN-FIELD GAMES
In this section, in the spirit of prescriptive game theory [3],
we design a mean-field game for the TCLs application, with
the aim of incentivizing cooperation among the TCLs through
an opportune design of cost functionals, one per each TCL.
Consider a population of hybrid controlled thermostat loads
(TCLs) and a time horizon window [0, T ]. Each TCL is
characterized by a continuous state, namely the temperature
x(t), and a binary state pion(t) ∈ {0, 1}, which represents the
condition on or off at time t ∈ [0, T ]. When the TCL is set to
on the temperature decreases exponentially up to a fixed lower
temperature xon whereas in the off position the temperature
increases exponentially up to a higher temperature xoff . Then,
the temperature of each appliance evolves according to the
following differential equations, for all t ∈ [0, T ):
x˙(t) =
{ −α(x(t)− xon) if pion(t) = 1
−β(x(t)− xoff ) if pion(t) = 0 , (1)
where the initial state is x(0) = x and where the rates α, β
are given positive scalars.
In accordance with [2], [4] we set the problem in a stochas-
tic framework where each TCL is in one of the two states on
or off with given probabilities pion ∈ [0, 1] and pioff ∈ [0, 1].
The control variable is the transitioning rate uon from off to
on and the transitioning rate uoff from on to off . This is
illustrated in the automata in Fig. 1.
pion pioff
uon
uoff 1− uon
1− uoff
Fig. 1: Automata describing transition rates from on to off
and vice versa.
The corresponding dynamics is then given by p˙ion(t) = uon(t)− uoff (t), t ∈ [0, T ),p˙ioff (t) = uoff (t)− uon(t), t ∈ [0, T ),
0 ≤ pion(t), pioff (t) ≤ 1, t ∈ [0, T ).
(2)
As p˙ion(t) + p˙ioff (t) = 0, we can simply consider only one
of the above dynamics. Then, let us denote y(t) = pion(t) and
introduce a stochastic disturbance in the form of a Brownian
motion, denote it B(t), and a deterministic disturbance w(t) =
[w1(t) w2]
T . For any x, y in the
“set of feasible states” S :=]xon, xoff [×]0, 1[,
the resulting dynamics in a very general form is given by
dx(t) =
(
y(t)
[
− α(x(t)− xon)
]
+(1− y(t))
[
− β(x(t)− xoff )
]
+d11w1(t) + d12w2(t)
)
dt+ σ11(x)dB(t),
=:
(
f(x(t), y(t)) + d11w1(t) + d12w2(t)
)
dt
+σ11(x)dB(t), t ∈ [0, T ),
x(0) = x,
dy(t) =
(
uon(t)− uoff (t) + d21w1(t)
+d22w2(t)
)
dt+ σ22(y)dB(t)
=:
(
g(u(t)) + d21w1(t)
+d22w2(t)
)
dt+ σ2(y)dB(t), t ∈ [0, T ),
y(0) = y,
(3)
where σij and dij , i, j = 1, 2 are positive scalar coefficients.
For a mean-field game formulation, consider a prob-
ability density function m : [xon, xoff ] × [0, 1] ×
[t, T ] → [0,+∞[, (x, y, t) 7→ m(x, y, t), which satisfies∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
m(x, y, t)dxdy = 1 for every t. Let us also
define as mon(t) :=
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
ym(x, y, t)dxdy. Likewise we
denote by moff (t) = 1−mon(t).
At every time t the mains frequency depends linearly on the
discrepancy between the percentage of TCLs in on position
and a nominal value. We call such a discrepancy as error and
denote it by e(t) = mon(t)−mon, where mon is the nominal
value (the higher the percentage of TCLs in on position with
respect to the nominal value, the lower the network frequency).
Note that the grid frequency is related to the power mismatch
between supply and demand. Here we assume that the power
supply is equal to the nominal power consumption all the time.
We then consider the running cost below, which depends on
the distribution m(x, y, t) through the error e(t):
c(x(t), y(t), u(t),m(x, y, t)) =
1
2
(
qx(t)2 + ronuon(t)
2 + roffuoff (t)
2
)
+y(t)(Se(t) +W ),
(4)
where q, ron, roff , and S are opportune positive scalars.
Note that cost (4) includes four terms. The term 12qx(t)
2
penalizes the deviation of the TCLs’ temperature from the
nominal value, which we set to zero. Setting the nominal tem-
perature to a nonzero value would simply imply a translation
of the origin of the axes. The terms 12ronuon(t)
2 introduces
a cost for fast switching; i.e. this cost is zero when either
uon(t) = 0 (no switching) and is maximal when uon(t) = 1
(probability 1 of switching). A similar comment applies to
1
2roffuoff (t)
2. A positive error e(t) > 0, means that demand
exceeds supply. Thus, the term y(t)Se(t) penalizes the appli-
ances that are on when demand exceeds supply (e(t) > 0).
When supply exceeds demand, we have a negative error
e(t) > 0, and the term y(t)Se(t) penalizes the appliances
that are off . Finally, the term y(t)W minimizes the power
consumption, i.e., whenever the TCL is on the consumption is
W . Also consider a terminal cost g : R→ [0,+∞[, x 7→ g(x)
to be yet designed.
Problem statement. Given a finite horizon T > 0 and an
initial distribution m0 : [xon, xoff ]× [0, 1]→ [0,+∞[, mini-
mize over U and maximize over W , subject to the controlled
system (3), the cost functional
J(x, y, t, u(·), w(·)) = E
∫ T
0
(c(x(t), y(t), u(t),m(x, y, t))
−1
2
γ2‖w(t)‖2)dt+ g(X(T )),
where γ is a positive scalar, U and W are the sets of all mea-
surable state feedback closed-loop policies u(·) : [0,+∞[→ R
respectively, and w(·) : [0,+∞[→ R and m(·) is the time-
dependent function describing the evolution of the mean of
the distribution of the TCLs’ states.
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
This section reviews first- and second-order mean-field
games in preparation to apply the game to the problem at hand.
In the first case, the microscopic dynamics is deterministic and
the resulting mean-field game involves only the first derivatives
of the value function and of the density function. In the second
case, the microscopic dynamics is a stochastic differential
equation driven by a Brownian motion, which leads to the
involvement of second derivatives of the value function and
density function. In addition to this, this section specializes the
model to the application introduced in the previous section,
involving a population of TCLs.
A. First- and second-order mean-field games
This section streamlines some preliminary results on mean-
field games. Consider a generic cost and dynamics
J(X, 0, U(.)) = infU(.)
∫ T
t=0
c(X(t),m,U(.))dt
+g(X(T )),
X˙(t) = F (X(t), U(.)) in Rn,
(5)
where c(.) is the running cost, g(X) ∀ X ∈ in Rn is the
terminal penalty, and where U(.) is any state-feedback closed-
loop control policy. Let v(X, t) be the value function, i.e.,
the optimal value of J(X, t, U(·)). Then from [19] it is well-
known that the problem results in the following mean-field
game system

−∂tv(X, t)− F (X,U∗(X))∂Xv(X, t)
−c(X,m,U∗(X)) = 0 in Rn×]0, T ], (a)
v(X,T ) = g(X) ∀ X ∈ in Rn,
U∗(X, t) = argmaxU∈R{−F (X,U)
·∂Xv(X, t)− c(X,m,U)}, (b)
(6)
 ∂tm(X, t) + div(F (X,U
∗(X))m(X, t)) = 0
in Rn×]0, T ],
m(X, 0) = m0(X),∀ X ∈ in Rn.
(7)
The partial differential equation (PDE) 6 (a) is the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation which returns the value function
v(X, t) once we fix the distribution m(X, t); This PDE has to
be solved backwards with boundary conditions at final time T ,
represented by the last line in 6 (a). In 6 (b) we have the
optimal closed-loop control U∗(X, t) as maximizer of the
Hamiltonian function in the RHS. The PDE (7) represents the
transport equation of the measure m immersed in a vector field
F (X,U∗(X)); It returns the distribution m(X, t) once fixed
the optimal closed-loop control U∗(X, t) and consequently
the vector field F (X,U∗(X)). Such a PDE has to be solved
forwards with boundary condition at the initial time (see the
last line of (7)).
In a second-order mean-field game, the dynamics is a
stochastic differential equation driven by a Brownian motion,
and the cost function is considered through its expected value,
namely,
J(X, 0, U(.))
= infU(.) E
∫ T
t=0
c(X(t),m,U(X(t)))dt+ g(X(T ))
dX(t) = F (X(t), U(.))dt+ σ(X)dB(t) in Rn,
(8)
where B(t) ∈ Rn is the Brownian motion and σ(X) ∈ Rn×n
is the coefficient matrix.
From [19] the second-order mean-field game system is then
given by
−∂tv(X, t)− F (X,U∗(X))∂Xv(X, t)
−c(X,m,U∗(X))
− 12σ(X)σ(X)T : ∂XXv(X, t) = 0
in Rn×]0, T ], (a)
v(X,T ) = g(X) ∀ X ∈ in Rn,
U∗(X, t) = argmaxU∈R{−F (X,U)
·∂Xv(X, t)− c(X,m,U)}, (b)
(9)

∂tm(X, t) + div(F (X,U
∗(X))m(X, t))
− 12
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 ∂
2
XiXj
(σ˜ijm(X, t)) = 0
in Rn×]0, T ],
m(X, 0) = m0(X),∀ X ∈ in Rn,
(10)
where the symbol “:” denotes the Frobenius product and σ˜ij =∑n
k=1 σik(X)σjk(X).
In a second-order mean-field game the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation, as in 9 (a), involves the second-order deriva-
tives of the value function in the additional term represented
by the Frobenius product; Likewise, also the transport equation
as in (10) involves the second-order derivatives of the density
function. The rest of the system is similar to the first-order
case. Let us now specialize the above model to the TCLs
application introduced in the previous section.
B. Mean-field game for the TCL application
Specializing to our TCLs application, let v(x, y,m, t) be
the value function, i.e., the optimal value of J(x, y, t, u(·)).
Let us denote by
k(x(t)) = x(t)(β − α) + (αxon − βxoff ).
Then, the problem at hand can be rewritten in terms of the
state, control and disturbance vectors
X(t) =
[
x(t)
y(t)
]
, u(t) =
[
uon(t)
uoff (t)
]
, w(t) =
[
w1(t)
w2(t)
]
and yields the linear quadratic problem:
inf
u(·)
sup
w(·)
E
∫ T
0
[1
2
(
‖X(t)‖2Q + ‖u(t)‖2R − γ2‖w(t)‖2
)
+LTX(t)
]
dt+ g(X(T )),
dX(t) = (AX(t) +Bu(t) + C +Dw(t))dt
+ΣdB(t), in S
(11)
where
Q =
[
q 0
0 0
]
, R = r =
[
ron 0
0 roff
]
,
L(e) =
[
0
Se+W
]
, A(x) =
[ −β k(x)
0 0
]
,
B =
[
0 0
1 −1
]
, C =
[
βxoff
0
]
,
D =
[
d11 d12
d21 d22
]
, Σ =
[
σ11(x) 0
0 σ22(y)
]
.
(12)
The resulting mean-field game is given by
∂tVt(X) + infu supw
{
∂XVt(X)T
·(AX +Bu+ C +Dw) + 12
(
‖X‖2Q
+‖u‖2R − γ2‖w‖
)
+ LTX
}
+ 12 (σ11(x)
2∂xxv(X, t) (a)
+σ22(y)
2∂yyv(X, t)) = 0, in S × [0, T [,
v(X,T ) = g(X), in S
u∗(x, t) = argminu∈R
{
∂XVt(X)T
·(AX +Bu+ C +Dw∗) + 12‖u(t)‖2R
}
, (b)
w∗(x, t) = argmaxw∈R
{
∂XVt(X)T
·(AX +Bu∗ + C +Dw)− 12γ2‖w(t)‖2
}
(13)
and
∂tm(x, y, t) + div[(AX +Bu
+C +Dw) m(x, y, t)]
− 12
∑2
i=1
∑2
j=1 ∂
2
XiXj
(σ˜ijm(X, t)) = 0
in S×]0, T [,
m(xon, y, t) = m(xoff , y, t) = 0
∀ y ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, T ],
m(x, y, 0) = m0(x, y)
∀ x ∈ [xon, xoff ], y ∈ [0, 1]∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
m(x, y, t)dxdy = 1 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ],
(14)
where σ˜ij =
∑n
k=1 σik(X)σjk(X).
Essentially, the partial differential equation (PDE) (13) (a)
is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation which returns the value
function v(x, y,m, t) once we fix the distribution m(x, y, t);
This PDE has to be solved backwards with boundary condi-
tions at final time T , represented by the last line in 13 (a).
In 13 (b) we have the optimal closed-loop control u∗(x, t)
and worst-case disturbance w∗(x, t) as minimaximizers of the
Hamiltonian function in the RHS. The PDE (14) represents the
transport equation of the measure m immersed in a vector field
AX+Bu+C+Dw; It returns the distribution m(x, y, t) once
fixed both u∗(x, t) and w∗(x, t) and consequently the vector
field AX + Bu∗ + C + Dw∗. Such a PDE has to be solved
forwards with boundary condition at the initial time (see the
fourth line of (14)). Finally, once given m(x, y, t) from (c) and
entered into the running cost c(x, y,m, u) in (a), we obtain the
error 
mon(t) :=
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
ym(x, y, t)dxdy
∀t ∈ [0, T ],
e(t) = mon(t)−mon.
(15)
Note that
X¯(t) =
[
x¯(t)
y¯(t)
]
=
[
x¯(t)
mon
]
=
[ ∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
xm(x, y, t)dxdy∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
ym(x, y, t)dxdy
]
,
and therefore, henceforth we can refer to as mean-field equi-
librium solutions any pair (v(X, t), X¯(t)) which is solution of
(13)-(14).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
The contribution of this paper to the TCLs application intro-
duced earlier is three-fold. First, we analyze and compute the
mean-field equilibrium for the deterministic mean-field game
and we prove that under certain conditions the microscopic
dynamics is asymptotically stable. We repeat the analysis for
the stochastic case, assuming that the microscopic dynamics
is uncertain. Even for this case, a mean-field equilibrium is
computed, and stochastic stability is studied. We distinguish
two cases. In the first case, we consider a state dependent
stochastic disturbance which vanishes around the origin. The
Brownian motion coefficients are linear in the state and the
resulting dynamics is also known as geometric Brownian
motion. In the second case, we take the stochastic disturbance
being independent on the state. The Brownian motion coef-
ficients are constant and the resulting dynamics mirrors the
Langevin equation. In both cases we prove stochastic stability
of second-moment for the stochastic process at hand. This
section ends with a detailed analysis of robustness properties.
The microscopic dynamics is now subject to an additional
exogenous input, the disturbance, with bounded energy. We
conclude our study by obtaining the mean-field equilibrium
and investigating conditions that guarantee stability even in
the presence of such a disturbance.
A. Mean-field equilibrium and stability
In this section we establish an explicit solution in terms
of mean-field equilibrium for the deterministic case and study
stability of the microscopic dynamics. This case is obtained by
fixing to zero the coefficients of both stochastic and adversarial
disturbance.
The linear quadratic problem we wish to solve is then:
inf
u(·)
∫ T
0
[1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)T
)
+LTX(t)
]
dt+ g(X(T )),
X˙(t) = AX(t) +Bu(t) + C in S.
(16)
The next result shows that the problem reduces to solving
three matrix equations.
Theorem 1: (Mean-field equilibrium) Let D,Σ = 0 in
the game (13)-(14). A mean-field equilibrium for (13)-(14)
is given by
v(X, t) = 12X
TP (t)X + Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
˙¯X(t) = [A(x)−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)
−BR−1BT Ψ¯(t) + C,
(17)
where
P˙ + PA(x) +A(x)TP − PBR−1BTP +Q = 0
in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙ +A(x)TΨ + PC − PBR−1BTΨ + L = 0
in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙+ ΨTC − 12ΨTBR−1BTΨ = 0 in [0, T [,
χ(T ) = 0,
(18)
and Ψ¯(t) =
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
Ψ(t)m(x, y, t)dxdy and where the
boundary conditions are obtained by imposing that
v(X,T ) =
1
2
XTP (T )X+Ψ(T )X+χ(T ) =
1
2
XTφX =: g(X).
Furthermore, the mean-field equilibrium strategy is
u∗(X, t) = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ]. (19)
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
Let us note that by substituting the mean-field equilibrium
strategies u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+Ψ] given in (19) in the open-
loop microscopic dynamics X˙(t) = AX(t) + Bu(t) + C as
defined in (16), the closed-loop microscopic dynamics is
X˙(t) = [A(x)−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ(x, e, t) + C. (20)
In the above, and occasionally in the following, we highlight
the dependence of Ψ on x, e, and t. Such a dependence is
shown in the proof of Theorem 1. Now, let X be the set of
equilibrium points for (20), namely, the set of X such that
X = {(X, e) ∈ R2 × R| [A(x)−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ(x, e, t) + C = 0},
and let V (X, t) = dist(X,X ). The next result establishes a
condition under which the above dynamics converges asymp-
totically to the set of equilibrium points.
Corollary 1: (Asymptotic stability) If it holds
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C
)
< −‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
(21)
then dynamics (20) is asymptotically stable, namely,
limt→∞ V (X(t)) = 0.
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
B. Stochastic case
In this section we study the case where the dynamics
is given by a stochastic differential equation driven by a
Brownian motion. In other words, the model is uncertain and
the uncertainty is described by a stochastic disturbance.
The problem at hand is then:
inf
u(·)
E
∫ T
0
[1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)T
)
+LTX(t)
]
dt+ g(X(T )),
dX(t) = (AX(t) +Bu(t) + C)dt+ ΣdBt,
(22)
where all matrices are as in (12) and
Σ =
[
σ11(x) 0
0 σ22(y)
]
.
This section investigates on the solution of the HJI equation
under the assumption that the time evolution of the common
state is given. We show that the problem reduces to solving
three matrix equations. To see this, by isolating the HJI part
of (13) for fixed mt, for t ∈ [0, T ], we have
−∂tv(X, t)− supu
{
− ∂Xv(X, t)T (AX +Bu+ C)
− 12
(
XTQX − uTRu
)
− LTX
}
+ 12 (σ11(x)
2∂xxv(X, t)
+σ22(y)
2∂yyv(X, t)) = 0, in S × [0, T [,
v(X,T ) = g(X) in S,
u∗(x, t) = −r−1BT∂yv(X, t).
Let us consider the following value function
v(X, t) =
1
2
XTP (t)X + Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
and
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ],
so that (13) can be rewritten as
1
2X
T P˙ (t)X + Ψ˙(t)X + χ˙(t)
+(P (t)X + Ψ(t))T
[
−BR−1BT
]
·(P (t)X + Ψ(t))
+(P (t)X + Ψ(t))T (AX + C)
+ 12
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)T
)
+LTX(t) + 12 (σ11(x)
2P11(t)
+σ22(y)
2P22(t)) = 0 in S × [0, T [,
P (T ) = φ, Ψ(T ) = 0, χ(T ) = 0.
(23)
The boundary conditions are obtained by imposing that
v(X,T ) =
1
2
XTP (T )X+Ψ(T )X+χ(T ) =
1
2
XTφX =: g(X).
1) Case I: state dependent variance: The first case we
consider involves coefficients for the Brownian motion which
are linear in the state, namely for given positive σˆ11 and σˆ22
Σ(X) =
[
σˆ11x 0
0 σˆ22y
]
. (24)
Theorem 2: (Stochastic mean-field equilibrium: case I)
A mean-field equilibrium for the game (13)-(14) with Σ(X)
as in (24) is given by
v(X, t) = 12X
TP (t)X + Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
˙¯X(t) = [A−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)
−BR−1BTΨ(X¯(t)) + C,
(25)
where
P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ATP − PBR−1BTP
+Q+ P˜ = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) +ATΨ + PC − PBR−1BTΨ
+L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC − 12ΨTBR−1BTΨ = 0
in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(26)
and
P˜ = Diag((σˆ2iiPii)i=1,2) =
[
σˆ211P11 0
0 σˆ222P22
]
. (27)
Furthermore, the mean-field equilibrium strategy is
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ] (28)
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
Based on the above result, let us now substitute the
expression of the mean-field equilibrium strategy u∗ =
−R−1BT [PX + Ψ] as in (28) in the open-loop microscopic
dynamics dX(t) = (AX(t) + Bu(t) + C)dt+ ΣdB(t) given
in (22) to obtain the closed-loop microscopic dynamics
dX(t) =
[
(A(x)−BR−1BTP )X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C
]
dt+ ΣdB(t).
(29)
Now, let X be the set of equilibrium points for (29), namely,
the set of X such that
X = {(X, e) ∈ R2 × R| (A(x)−BR−1BTP )X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C = 0}, (30)
and let V (X, t) = dist(X,X ). We are in a position to
state conditions under which the distance from the set of
equilibrium points has bounded variance.
Corollary 2: (2nd moment boudedness) Let a compact set
M⊂ R2 be given. Suppose that for all X 6∈ M
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C
)
< − 12 (σ211(x)∂xxV (X, t) + σ222(x)∂yyV (X, t))
(31)
then dynamics (29) is a stochastic process and the distance
V (X(t)) is 2nd moment bounded.
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
2) Case II: state independent variance and Langevin equa-
tion: The second case we consider involves coefficients for
the Brownian motion which are constant, namely
Σ =
[
σˆ11 0
0 σˆ22
]
. (32)
Theorem 3: (Stochastic mean-field equilibrium: case II)
Let Σ be as in (32). A mean-field equilibrium for the game
(13)-(14) is given by
v(X, t) = 12X
TP (t)X + Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
˙¯X(t) = [A−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)
−BR−1BTΨ(X¯(t)) + C,
(33)
where 
P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ATP − PBR−1BTP
+Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) +ATΨ + PC − PBR−1BTΨ
+L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC − 12ΨTBR−1BTΨ
+P˜ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(34)
and
P˜ =
[
σˆ211 0
0 σˆ222
]
. (35)
Furthermore, the mean-field equilibrium strategies are given
by
u∗(X, t) = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ]. (36)
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
Based on the above result, let us now substitute the
expression of the mean-field equilibrium strategy u∗ =
−R−1BT [PX + Ψ] as in (36) in the open-loop microscopic
dynamics dX(t) = (AX(t) + Bu(t) + C)dt+ ΣdB(t) given
in (22) to obtain the closed-loop microscopic dynamics
dX(t) =
[
(A(x)−BR−1BTP )X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C
]
dt+ ΣdB(t).
(37)
Now, let X be the set of equilibrium points for (37), namely,
the set of X such that
X = {(X, e) ∈ R2 × R| (A(x)−BR−1BTP )X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C = 0}, (38)
and let V (X, t) = dist(X,X ). The next result establishes a
condition under which the distance from the set of equilibrium
points is 2nd moment bounded.
Corollary 3: (2nd moment boundedness) Let a compact
set M⊂ R2 be given. Suppose that for all X 6∈ M
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C
)
< − 12 (σˆ211∂xxV (X, t) + σˆ222∂yyV (X, t))
(39)
then dynamics (37) is a stochastic process and V (X(t)) is 2nd
moment bounded.
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
C. Model misspecification
This section deals with model misspecification, which is
represented by an additional exogenous and adversarial distur-
bance. The disturbance is supposed to be of bounded energy.
Thus, the linear quadratic problem we wish to solve is:
inf
u(·)
sup
w(·)
E
∫ T
0
[1
2
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)
−γ2w(t)Tw(t)
)
+ LTX(t)
]
dt+ g(X(T )),
X˙(t) = AX(t) +Bu(t) + C +Dw(t) in S.
(40)
This section investigates the solution of the HJI equation under
the assumption that the time evolution of the common state
is given. We show that the problem reduces to solving three
matrix equations. To see this, by isolating the HJI part of (13)
for fixed mt, for t ∈ [0, T ], we have the following result.
Theorem 4: (Worst-case mean-field equilibrium)
A mean-field equilibrium for (13)-(14) is given by
v(X, t) = 12X
TP (t)X + Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
˙¯X(t) = [A−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)
−BR−1BTΨ(X¯(t)) + C,
(41)
where
P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ATP + P (−BR−1BT
+ 1γ2DD
T )P +Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) +ATΨ + PC + (−BR−1BT
+ 1γ2DD
T )Ψ + L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC + 12Ψ
T (−BR−1BT
+ 1γ2DD
T )Ψ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0.
(42)
Furthermore, the mean-field equilibrium control and distur-
bance are
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ],
w∗ = 1γ2D
T [PX + Ψ].
(43)
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
Note that by substituting the mean-field equilibrium strate-
gies u∗ = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ] and w∗ = 1γ2DT [PX + Ψ]
as given in (43) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics
α β xon xon ron, roff q std(m0) m¯0
1 1 −10 10 10 1 1 0
TABLE I: Simulation parameters
X˙(t) = AX(t) + Bu(t) + C + Dw as defined in (40), the
closed-loop microscopic dynamics is
X˙(t) = [A(x) + (−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )P ]X(t)
+(−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )Ψ + C.
(44)
Now, let X be the set of equilibrium points for (44), namely,
the set of X such that
X = {(X, e)| [A(x) + (−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )P ]
·X(t) + (−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )Ψ + C = 0},
(45)
and let V (X, t) = dist(X,X ). The next result establishes a
condition under which the above dynamics converges asymp-
totically to the set of equilibrium points.
Corollary 4: (Worst-case stability) If it holds
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A+ (−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )P ]X(t)
+(−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )Ψ + C
)
< −‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
(46)
then dynamics (44) is asymptotically stable, namely,
limt→∞ dist(X(t),X ) = 0.
Proof. Given in the appendix. 
V. NUMERICAL STUDIES
Consider a system consisting of n = 102 TCLs. The size of
the population is large enough to highlight mass interaction.
Simulations are carried out with MATLAB on an Intel(R)
Core(TM)2 Duo, CPU P8400 at 2.27 GHz and a 3GB of RAM.
The number of iterations is T = 30. Consider a discrete time
version of (16)
X(t+ dt) = X(t) + (A(x(t))X(t) +Bu(t) + C)dt. (47)
The parameter are as shown in Table I and in particular the
step size dt = 0.1, the cooling and heating rates are α = β =
1, the lowest and highest temperatures are xon = −10, and
xoff = 10, respectively, the penalty coefficients are ron =
roff = 1, and q = 1, and the initial distribution is normal
with zero mean and standard deviation std(m(0)) = 1.
The numerical results are obtained using the algorithm in
Table II for a discretized set of states.
The optimal control is taken as
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ],
where P is obtained from running the MATLAB command
[P]=care(A,B,Q,R), which receives the matrices as input
and returns the solution P to the algebraic Riccati equation.
Assuming BR−1BTΨ ≈ C we get the closed-loop dynamics
X(t+ dt) = X(t) + [A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)dt.
Figure 2 displays the time plot of the state of each TCL,
namely its temperature x(t) (top row) and mode y(t) (bottom
row). The TCLs show a stable behavior. The simulation is
Input: Set of parameters as in Table I.
Output: TCLs’ states X(t)
1 : Initialize. Generate X(0) given m¯0 and std(m0)
2 : for time iter = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
3 : if iter > 0, then compute mt, m¯t, and std(mt)
4 : end if
5 : for player i = 1, . . . , n do
6 : Set t = iter · dt and
compute control u˜(t) using current m¯(t)
7 : compute X(t+ dt) from (47)
8 : end for
9 : end for
10 : STOP
TABLE II: Simulation algorithm
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Fig. 2: Time plot of the state of each TCL, namely temperature
x(t) (top row) and mode y(t) (bottom row) in the deterministic
case.
carried out assuming that any 10 seconds the states are subject
to an impulse. The TCLs react to the impulse fast and converge
to the equilibrium point before a new impulse is activated.
We repeat the simulation for the two stochastic cases
discussed earlier. Figure 3 displays the plot of the state of each
TCL, i.e. its temperature x(t) (top row) and mode y(t) (bottom
row) in the first case. The TCLs react to the impulse and
converge to the equilibrium before a new impulse is activated.
The Brownian motion enlarges the domain of attraction.
The experiment is repeated in Figure 4 for the geometric
Brownian motion. As in the previous cases the plot displays
the state of each TCL, i.e. its temperature x(t) (top row) and
mode y(t) (bottom row) in the first case. As the Brownian
motion is not weighted by the state, its effects are attenuated
and the plot is more similar to the one in Fig. 2.
Note that except for the Langevin-type dynamics, in the
remainder two cases the TCLs states are driven to zero. For
the Langevin-type dynamics the state is confined within a
neighborhood of zero.
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Fig. 3: Time plot of temperature x(t) (top row) and mode
y(t) (bottom row) of each TCL in the stochastic case with
state dependent variance.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
−4
−2
0
2
4
te
m
pe
at
ur
e
time
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
m
o
de
time
Fig. 4: Time plot of temperature x(t) (top row) and mode
y(t) (bottom row) of each TCL in the stochastic case with
state independent variance.
VI. DISCUSSION
The topic of dynamic response has sparked attention from
different disciplines. This is witnessed by the rapid growing
of publications in different areas, from differential games [4],
[11] to control and optimization [2], [10], [21], [22], [23], to
computer science [26]. Actually, dynamic response intersects
research programs in smart buildings and smart cities. The
problem is relevant due to an increasing size of the systems
and the consequent difficulties arising when centralizing the
management.
The results of this paper are relevant for the following
reasons. First, the game-theoretic approach presented here is a
natural way to deal with large scale, distributed systems where
no central planner can process all the information data. One
way to deal with this issue, which is the main idea of dynamic
demand, aims at assigning part of the regulation burden to
the consumers by using frequency responsive appliances. In
other words, each appliance regulates automatically and in a
decentralized fashion its power demand based on the mains
frequency. In this respect, the provided model builds upon
the strategic interaction among the electrical appliances. The
model suits the case where the appliances are numerous and
indistinguishable. Indistinguishable means that any appliance
in the same condition will react in the same way. Indistin-
guishability is not a limitation, as in the case of heterogeneity
of the electrical appliances, multi-population models may be
derived based on the same approach used here.
The results provided in this paper shed light on the exis-
tence of mean-field equilibrium solutions. By this we mean
strategies based on the forecasted demand, which attenuate
mains frequency oscillations. Such strategies are stochastic,
namely the TCL sets a probability with which to switch on
or off . Stochastic linear strategies are designed as closed-
loop strategies on the current state, temperature and switching
mode. Such strategies are computed over a finite horizon and
therefore are based on forecasted demand. The mean-field
equilibrium strategies represent the asymptotic limit of Nash
equilibrium strategies, and as such they are the best-response
strategies of each player, for fixed behavior of the other
players. The proven stability of the microscopic dynamics
confirms the asymptotic convergence of the TCLs’s states to
an equilibrium, in terms of temperature and switching mode.
The cases studied in the paper have shown that the strategies
are robust as convergence occurs also with imperfect models.
In the case of imperfect modeling, model misspecifications are
considered both in a stochastic and deterministic scenario.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have developed a model based on mean-field games
for a population of thermostatically controlled loads. The
model integrates both stochastic or deterministic disturbances.
We have studied robust equilibria and designed stabilizing
stochastic control strategies.
Within the realm of mean-field games, we can extend our
study in at least three directions. These include i) the analysis
of the interplay between dynamic pricing and demand re-
sponse, ii) the study of the benefits associated with coalitional
aggregation of a large number of power producers, and iii) the
design of incentives to stabilize aggregation of producers.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Let us start by isolating the HJI part of (13). For fixed mt
and for t ∈ [0, T ], we have
−∂tv(x, y, t)−
{
y
[
− α(x− xon)
]
+(1− y)
[
− β(x− xoff )
]}
∂xv(x, y, t)
+ supu∈R
{
−Bu∂yv(x, y, t)− 12qx2
+ 12u
T ru+ y(Se+W )
}
= 0
in S×]0, T ],
v(x, y, T ) = g(x) in S,
u∗(x, t) = −r−1BT∂yv(x, y, t),
(48)
which in a more compact form can be rewritten as
−∂tv(X, t)− supu
{
∂Xv(X, t)
T (AX +Bu+ C)
+ 12
(
XTQX + uTRuT
)
+ LTX
}
= 0, in S × [0, T [,
v(X,T ) = g(X) in S,
u∗(x, t) = −r−1BT∂yv(X, t).
Let us consider the following value function
v(X, t) =
1
2
XTP (t)X + Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
and the corresponding optimal closed-loop state feedback
strategy
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ].
Then (48) can be rewritten as
1
2X
T P˙ (t)X + Ψ˙(t)X + χ˙(t)
+(P (t)X + Ψ(t))T
[
−BR−1BT
]
·(P (t)X + Ψ(t))
+(P (t)X + Ψ(t))T (AX + C)
+ 12
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)T
)
+LTX(t) = 0 in S × [0, T [,
P (T ) = φ, Ψ(T ) = 0, χ(T ) = 0.
(49)
The boundary conditions are obtained by imposing that
v(X,T ) =
1
2
XTP (T )X+Ψ(T )X+χ(T ) =
1
2
XTφX =: g(X).
Since (49) is an identity in X , it reduces to three equations:
P˙ + PA(x) +A(x)TP − PBR−1BTP
+Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙ +A(x)TΨ + PC − PBR−1BTΨ + L = 0
in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙+ ΨTC − 12ΨTBR−1BTΨ = 0
in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0.
(50)
To understand the influence of the congestion term on the
value function, let us develop the expression for Ψ and obtain
[
Ψ˙1
Ψ˙2
]
+
[ −β 0
k(x(t)) 0
] [
Ψ1
Ψ2
]
+
[
P11 P12
P21 P22
] [
βxoff
0
]
−
[
P12(r
−1
on + r
−1
off )Ψ2
P22(r
−1
on + r
−1
off )Ψ2
]
+
[
0
Se+W
]
.
(51)
The expression of Ψ then can be rewritten as
Ψ˙1 − βΨ1 + P11βxoff
−P12(r−1on + r−1off )Ψ2 = 0,
Ψ˙2 + k(x(t))Ψ1 − P22(r−1on + r−1off )Ψ2
+(Se+W ) = 0,
(52)
which is of the form{
Ψ˙1 + aΨ1 + bΨ2 + c = 0,
Ψ˙2 + a
′Ψ1 + b′Ψ2 + c′ = 0.
(53)
From the above set of inequalities, we obtain the solution
Ψ(x(t), e(t), t). Note that the term a′ depends on x and c′
depends on e(t).
Substituting the expression of the mean-field equilibrium
strategies u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+Ψ] as in (19) in the open-loop
microscopic dynamics X˙(t) = AX(t)+Bu(t)+C introduced
in (16), and averaging both LHS and RHS we obtain the
following closed-loop macroscopic dynamics
˙¯X(t) = [A(x)−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)−BR−1BT Ψ¯(t) + C,
where Ψ¯(t) =
∫ xoff
xon
∫
[0,1]
Ψ(x, e, t)m(x, y, t)dxdy and this
concludes our proof.
Proof of Corollary 1
Let X(t) be a solution of dynamics (20) with initial value
X(0) 6∈ X . Set t = {inf t > 0|X(t) ∈ X} ≤ ∞. For all
t ∈ [0, t]
V (X(t+ dt))− V (X(t))
= 1‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
− 1‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2.
Taking the limit of the difference above we obtain
V˙ (X(t)) = limdt→0
V (X(t+dt))−V (X(t))
dt
= limdt→0 1dt
[
1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t) + dX(t)
−ΠX (X(t))‖2
− 1‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
]
≤ 1‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
[
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C
)
+ ‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
]
< 0,
which implies V˙ (X(t)) < 0, for all X(t) 6∈ X and this
concludes our proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
This proof follows the same reasoning as the proof of
Theorem 1. However, differently from there, here for the
quadratic terms in (23) we have
σ11(x)
2P11(t)+σ22(y)
2P22(t) = σˆ
2
11x
2P11(t)+σˆ
2
22y
2P22(t).
Reviewing (23) as an identity in x, this leads to the following
three equations to solve in the variable P (t), Ψ(t), and χ(t):
P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ATP − PBR−1BTP +Q
+P˜ = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) +ATΨ + PC − PBR−1BTΨ
+L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC − 12ΨTBR−1BTΨ = 0
in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(54)
where
P˜ = Diag((σˆ2iiPii)i=1,2) =
[
σˆ211P11 0
0 σˆ222P22
]
. (55)
Proof of Corollary 2
Let X(t) be a solution of dynamics (29) with initial value
X(0) 6∈ X . Set t = {inf t > 0|X(t) ∈ X} ≤ ∞ and let
V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). For all t ∈ [0, t]
V (X(t+ dt))− V (X(t)) = ‖X(t+ dt)−ΠX (X(t))‖
−‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
= 1‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2−
1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2.
From the definition of infinitesimal generator
LV (X(t)) = limdt→0 EV (X(t+dt))−V (X(t))dt
≤ 1‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
[
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C
)
+ 12 (σ
2
11(x)∂xxV (X, t) + σ
2
22(y)∂yyV (X, t))
]
.
From (31) the above implies that LV (X(t)) < 0, for all
X(t) 6∈ M and this concludes our proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
From (32), in the HJB equation (23) we now have constant
terms
1
2
2∑
i=1
σii(.)
2Pii(t) = σˆ
2
11P11(t) + σˆ
2
22P22(t).
Again, since the HJB equation (23) is an identity in x, it
reduces to three equations:
P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ATP − PBR−1BTP
+Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) +ATΨ + PC − PBR−1BTΨ
+L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC − 12ΨTBR−1BTΨ
+P˜ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0,
(56)
where
P˜ =
[
σˆ211 0
0 σˆ222
]
. (57)
Substituting the expression of the mean-field equilibrium
strategy u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+ Ψ] as in (36) in the open-loop
microscopic dynamics dX(t) = (AX(t) + Bu(t) + C)dt +
ΣdBt given in (22) and averaging both LHS and RHS we
obtain the following closed-loop macroscopic dynamics
˙¯X(t) = [A−BR−1BTP ]X¯(t)−BR−1BTΨ(X¯(t)) + C,
and this concludes our proof.
A. Proof of Corollary 3
Let X(t) be a solution of dynamics (37) with initial value
X(0) 6∈ X . Set t = {inf t > 0|X(t) ∈ X} ≤ ∞ and let
V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). For all t ∈ [0, t]
V (X(t+ dt))− V (X(t)) = ‖X(t+ dt)−ΠX (X(t))‖
−‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
= 1‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2−
1
‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
From the definition of infinitesimal generator
LV (X(t)) = limdt→0 EV (X(t+dt))−V (X(t))dt
= limdt→0 1dt
[
E
(
1
‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
)
− 1‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
]
≤ 1‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
[
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A−BR−1BTP ]X(t)
−BR−1BTΨ + C
)
+ 12 (σˆ
2
11∂xxV (X, t) + σˆ
2
22∂yyV (X, t))
]
.
From (39) the above implies that LV (X(t)) < 0, for all
X(t) 6∈ M and this concludes our proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
Isolating the HJI equation in (13), we have
−∂tVt(X)− supu infw
{
∂XVt(X)T (AX +Bu
+C +Dw) + 12
(
X(t)TQX(t)
+u(t)TRu(t)− γ2w(t)Tw(t)
)
+ LTX(t)
}
= 0,
in S × [0, T [,
VT (X) = g(X) in S.
(58)
Let us consider the following value function
v(X, t) =
1
2
XTP (t)X + Ψ(t)TX + χ(t),
and the corresponding mean-field equilibrium control and
worst-case disturbance
u∗ = −R−1BT [PX + Ψ],
w∗ = 1γ2D
T [PX + Ψ].
Then (58) can be rewritten as

1
2X
T P˙ (t)X + Ψ˙(t)X + χ˙(t)
+(P (t)X + Ψ(t))T
[
−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT
]
·(P (t)x+ Ψ(t)) + (P (t)x+ Ψ(t))T (AX + C)
+ 12
(
X(t)TQX(t) + u(t)TRu(t)− γ2w(t)Tw(t)
)
+LTX(t) + 12
∑2
i=1 σii(.)
2Pii(t) = 0
in R2 × [0, T [,
P (T ) = φ, Ψ(T ) = 0, χ(T ) = 0.
The boundary conditions are obtained by imposing that
v(X,T ) =
1
2
XTP (T )X+Ψ(T )X+χ(T ) =
1
2
XTφX =: g(X).
The above set of identities in x yields the following three
equations in the variable P (t), Ψ(t), and χ(t):
P˙ (t) + P (t)A+ATP + P (−BR−1BT
+ 1γ2DD
T )P +Q = 0 in [0, T [, P (T ) = φ,
Ψ˙(t) +ATΨ + PC + (−BR−1BT
+ 1γ2DD
T )Ψ + L = 0 in [0, T [, Ψ(T ) = 0,
χ˙(t) + Ψ(t)TC + 12Ψ
T (−BR−1BT
+ 1γ2DD
T )Ψ = 0 in [0, T [, χ(T ) = 0.
(59)
Substituting the expressions of the mean-field equilibrium
strategies u∗ = −R−1BT [PX+Ψ] and w∗ = 1γ2DT [PX+Ψ]
as in (43) in the open-loop microscopic dynamics X˙(t) =
AX(t) + Bu(t) + C introduced in (40), and averaging both
LHS and RHS we obtain the following closed-loop macro-
scopic dynamics
˙¯X(t) = [A+ (−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )P ]X¯(t)
+(−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )Ψ(X¯(t)) + C,
(60)
and this concludes our proof.
Proof of Corollary 4
Let X(t) be a solution of dynamics (44) with initial value
X(0) 6= X . Set t = {inf t > 0|X(t) ∈ X} ≤ ∞ and let
V (X(t)) = dist(X(t),X ). For all t ∈ [0, t]
V (X(t+ dt))− V (X(t)) = ‖X(t+ dt)−ΠX (X(t))‖
−‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
= 1‖X(t)+dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t) + dX(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2
− 1‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖2.
Using the asymptotic limit to differentiate the distance we have
V˙ (X(t)) = limdt→0
V (X(t+dt))−V (X(t))
dt
≤ 1‖X(t)−ΠX (X(t))‖
[
∂XV (X, t)
T
(
[A+ (−BR−1BT
+ 1γ2DD
T )P ]X(t)
+(−BR−1BT + 1γ2DDT )Ψ + C
)
≤ 0
which implies V˙ (X(t)) < 0, for all X(t) 6= X and this
concludes our proof.
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